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THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF AUDITORS UNDER SWISS LAW
Peter FORSTMOSER *
1. Introduction
Several recent decisions of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgericht)
have expanded the liability of corporate auditors to corporations, shareholders
and creditors. This article outlines the position, eligibility and duties of
auditors, defines the prerequisites of liability, describes the assessment of
damages, enumerates the persons entitled to sue, and delineates their rights of
action [1].
2. Position, eligibility and duties of auditors
2.1. Position
The Swiss Code of Obligations (hereinafter cited as the Code, CO) [2]
mandates three corporate organs [3]. The general meeting of shareholders
adopts and amends the articles of incorporation, approves the issue of capital
stock, and elects members of the other organs. The board of directors acts as
an executive organ, responsible for managerial functions. The auditors examine
the accounting procedures and calculations used in corporate reporting. Audi-
tors are elected by the shareholders, pursuant to the Code, Art. 727 1, for terms
of one to three years. The auditors may be re-elected indefinitely.
Additional organs may be established by means of the by-laws. Those
additional organs, however, can be assigned no duties which, pursuant to the
Code, belong to one of the three statutory organs.
2.2. Eligibility
Auditors may not be members of the board of directors or employees of the
audited corporation. This is the only qualification required for most auditing
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positions. No expert knowledge is required and, in practice, many auditors are
non-professionals [4].
Exceptions to this general rule exist for banks and certain large corpora-
tions. If a corporation has capital stock of five million francs or more, has
issued bonds, or attempted to float a public issue, CO Art. 723 requires that
the balance sheet be examined by independent professional auditors. Bank
auditing can be done only by members of specially qualified professional
auditory firms which have been certified by the Banking Commission.
2.3. Duties
2.3.1. General duties
Pursuant to CO Art. 728 I, auditors must conduct an examination to
determine whether a corporation's profit and loss statement and balance sheet
conform with its books, whether the books are kept properly, and whether the
business results and. financial position represented in the financial statements
comply with statutory requirements as to valuation. Auditors must also ex-
amine the corporation's books to see whether they comply with any relevant
special provisions of the articles of incorporation.
These statutory duties represent the minimum efforts required of auditors.
They lack specificity and therefore must be interpreted by reference to corpo-
rate [5] and general bookkeeping rules [6]. In practice, a number of rules have
emerged.
Auditing once involved little more than mathematical verification of book-
keepers' computations [7]. For example, the Bundesgericht once held that
auditors were not required to certify the accuracy of individual valuation
claims [8]. Today, a mere bookkeeping check is not sufficient. Auditors must
examine the propriety of the corporation's bookkeeping system. For example,
the Court recently declared that although auditors are not obliged to examine
the value of every balance sheet entry, they must ensure that the most
important assets are not valued at costs that exceed the original acquisition or
production costs less adequate depreciation applicable under the circumstances
[9].
In 1967 the Bundesgericht expanded the duties of auditors even further,
BGE 93 (1967) II, at 22, by requiring auditors to ascertain whether the capital
surplus entries were accurate in view of unrecorded depreciation. The auditor
was also required to determine whether the valuation of inventory (the most
important item on the assets side of the balance sheet in question) had been
calculated according to the "principle of lowest value" laid down in CO Art.
666. According to this principle, raw materials must be recorded at the lowest
value as determined by purchase price, manufacturing cost, or market value.
The Court also required auditors to consult experts, if necessary.
Finally, the trend toward expansion of auditor's duties is evidenced by the
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1975 decision of the Ziurich Commercial Court, affirmed by the Bundesgericht,
holding auditors liable for damages for not drawing a fully consolidated
balance sheet [10] and for not examining several credits or the financial
situation of subsidiaries. Finally, a 1979 decision of the Ztirich High Court
(Obergericht) [11] held auditors liable for damages for relying on expert
opinions of the valuation of a corporation's real estate where the opinions were
given by individuals closely connected with the corporation and instructed by
it.
2.3.2. Duties of bank auditors
The duties of bank auditors exceed those of corporate auditors. Bank
auditors must examine the soundness of valuation of assets and liabilities.
Where necessary, they must conduct a comprehensive, independent verification
of the bank's assets and liabilities. They must also assess the legality of
accounting methods used and any distribution of profits. Any irregularities
that are discovered must be reported to the shareholders or board of directors.
and a deadline must be set for the bank to correct any such problems. If
necessary, the auditors are required to inform the Banking Commission [12]. In
contrast, corporate auditors are not required to set a deadline or to inform any
public authority.
3. The liability of auditors under Swiss law
Articles 752 through 761 of the Code enumerate the liabilities of members
of the various corporate organs. The basic provision concerning the liability of
auditors is CO Art. 754 I, which provides:
All persons appointed directors, managers or auditors are responsible to the company, as well as to
the individual stockholders and creditors of the company, for the damage caused, intentionally or
negligently, by default in their duties.
This provision enumerates both the elements necessary to establish liability (ie.
damage, breach of duty, negligence) and the classes of potential plaintiffs (the
company, its shareholders and creditors).
This section discusses the elements of liability. Section 4 will concentrate on
the classes of plaintiffs and the conditions under which they may sue.
3.1. Damage
Damage, or the loss of pecuniary value, is a prerequisite to any liability,
including, as specified in the statute, the liability of auditors. Where there is no
damage, liability claims are absolutely barred, even where there has been a
breach of duty.
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The burden of establishing the existence and extent of damages falls on the
plaintiff. The court may exercise its discretion to estimate the loss only where
evidence of the exact numerical loss is impossible or unreasonably difficult to
obtain. This estimate must be based on normal business practices and on the
plaintiff's own efforts to mitigate the harm [13]. Even where the court makes its
own estimate, however, the plaintiff has the burden of presenting whatever
evidence he has on the issue.
Occasionally, a breach of duty causes profits as well as damages. In
computing loss, such profits must be set-off against damages. Set-off is not
allowed, however, for profits which arise by reason of the auditor's day-to-day
performance of his duties. He is obliged to fullfill these duties at all times, and
any resulting profits rightfully belong to the corporation. Using them to reduce
the damage award would therefore amount to providing extra compensation to
the auditor.
3.2. Breach of duty
Auditor liability is premised upon a breach, or default, of some duty. The
articles on general corporate liability do not define the duties of auditors,
which are covered by specific statutory provisions. Articles 728 through 730 of
the Code outline three duties: the duty to examine the records [14]; the duty of
confidentiality [15]; and the duty to submit at the general meeting of share-
holders a written report containing a qualified or unqualified recommendation
that shareholders either accept the balance sheet or return it to the board of
directors. This report must also contain an opinion as to whether the board's
proposals for distributing profits comport with the corporation's articles of
incorporation or by-laws and the relevant statuory provisions [16].
Swiss courts have found each of the following acts and omissions to
constitute a breach of duty [17]:
o the failure to report a-consolidated balance sheet for a group of interdepen-
dent companies so closely related that they could be reliably evaluated only
when considered together [18];
® the failure to evaluate whether capital assets have been properly valued
according to the "highest valuation" principle, and to determine whether
the necessary write-offs have been taken [19];
@ the failure to examine the accuracy of the valuation of the most important
assets [20];
E the failure to accord proper weight to expert opinions, and the failure to
obtain independent experts when necessary [21];
® recommending the approval without qualification of the balance sheet
despite stated or presumed valuation faults [22] or recognizable insolvency
[23];
o accepting the position of auditor or continuing to act as auditor while failing
to call in an expert despite the lack of necessary expert knowledge [24].
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3.3. Negligence
As noted above, CO Art. 754 holds auditors liable for intentional or
negligent breaches of duty. Even slight negligence creates liability under
general principles of Swiss law. The degree of negligence is important, if at all,
only insofar as it may justify a reduction of damage awards [25].
Under Swiss law, the standard of care for determining negligence is an
objective one [26]. Thus, an auditor will be found negligent if he did not
exercise the amount of care which would be exercised by a conscientious and
reasonable man under the circumstances [27]. Subjective factors such as a
particular individual's want of knowledge, inexperience, or lack of time are
irrelevant [28]. Even the observance of diligentia quam in suis - of the care one
takes with his own affairs - is not necessarily sufficient [29]. The actual
circumstances and complexity of the duty, however, are relevant considerations
in determining whether the auditor was negligent [30].
3.4. Causation
An action for damages will lie against an auditor who has negligently
breached a duty only if this negligence was an "adequate" cause of harm.
Thus, although causation-in-fact is necessary [31], it is not sufficient. There
must also be a forseeable tendency for the conduct to cause the type of harm
which occurred. As explained by the Bundesgericht in BGE 93 (1967) 29, an
event is considered:
an adequate cause of an effect, if it was appropriate according to the normal way things go and to
the experience of life. to cause a result like the one which occurred, so that the occurrence of this
result generally seems to be favored by the event....
The threshold of adequate causation is not high in the area of corporate
liability. Furthermore, the auditor's breach of duty need not be the sole
cause-in-fact of the harm. It is enough that the breach is a cause-in-fact. That
other factors, such as the negligent conduct of a third person, contribute to the
harm is therefore irrelevant [32].
Finally, it should be noted that adequate cause will not be found where it is
clear from the facts that the proper exercise of the duty would not have
prevented the harm. However, this does not mean that a negligent auditor can
avoid liability by hypothesizing about what might have happened had he not
breached his duty; for example, an auditor may not claim that if he had acted
properly another organ would have acted negligently, thereby causing the
harm. Thus, the court imposed liability on an auditor who failed in his duty to
report, despite his plea that the board of directors would have ignored the
report [33]. Likewise, liability was imposed on an auditor who failed to submit
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a report to the shareholders' general meeting, although it was obvious that the
sole shareholder and sole member of the board of directors would not have
changed his conduct had the report been submitted [34].
3.5. -itigation of damages
Although demonstration of any negligence on the part of the auditor is
sufficient to give rise to a cause of action for damages, Swiss law recognizes
that damages may be mitigated in cases involving only slight negligence. Swiss
courts have reduced damage awards where the defendant's negligence was
minor [35]. Damages may also be reduced in situations where a plaintiff's own
negligence has contributed to his injury [36], but not in cases where a third
party is found negligent [37]. Other, exceptional factors may also warrant a
reduction of damages, e.g. the fact that the person liable would be subject to
distress as a result of his payment of damages [38].
3.6. Joint and several liability
Many cases of corporate liability involve more than one defendant. In such
cases, the law provides the plaintiff with a remedy which can be of striking
severity to a defendant. Pursuant to CO Art. 759 I, defendants are jointly and
severally liable for the total amount of damages owed. Thus, the plaintiff can
demand full recompense from any defendant he chooses [39].
Because the principle of joint and several liability is applicable not only
between members of the same corporate organ [40], but also, for example,
between members of the board and auditors, such liability may result in
serious and unjust consequences. For example, often the parties primarily
responsible for the harm, corporate directors who have acted criminally,
cannot be sued because they have moved abroad or because they lack adequate
financial resources. In such cases, the auditors, whose negligence may have
been very slight, can be liable for the entire amount of damages. The anoma-
lous result in this situotion is that the least guilty party pays fully for the acts
of the more egregious offender, who suffers no penalty at all [41].
The practice of the Bundesgericht in applying this principle has exacerbated
its inherent severity. Specifically, the Bundesgericht has refused to mitigate
damages where several parties are jointly liable. Nevertheless, mitigation is
allowed where there is only a single defendant. The paradox is clear: a single
defendant, though considerably negligent and solely responsible for the harm,
may enjoy mitigation of damages, whereas full damages may be demanded
from the most innocent of a group of defendants. In many cases, recoupment
will not prevent this injustice. Although a judge may apportion damages
according to the relative degrees of negligence of members of a group of
defendants [42], recoupment by one who pays the portions owed by others is
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often unlikely because the other defendants have become insolvent or have left
the country.
The principle of joint and several liability as practiced by the Bundesgericht
has elicited severe criticism [43]. The Court, however, continues to support it,
stressing that joint and several liability is designed to guarantee complete
satisfaction of the plaintiff's claim [44].
4. Persons entitled to sue
As noted above, CO Art. 754 I establishes not only the liability of auditors,
but identifies the persons entitled to sue them, namely the corporation, its
shareholders and creditors. As will be demonstrated, the statute has differenti-
ated the right of action, depending upon the plaintiffs and circumstances
involved.
4.1. The corporation
The corporation is entitled to sue if it suffers any loss by reason of a
negligent or willful breach of duty by the auditor. The loss does not have to be
so great that it causes the company to go into bankruptcy.
It is up to the board of directors to bring suit against the auditors on behalf
of the corporation. Their decision to sue does not require special authorization
or ratification by the shareholders [45]. The shareholders may prevent suit by
the corporation, however, by granting the auditors a valid release [46]. The
release is only valid against actions which actually were known or could have
been known to the shareholders [471. Normally, however, the board of direc-
tors does not bring a breach of duty to the shareholders' attention. Thus, a
general release is often invalid because the shareholders are not sufficiently
informed.
4.2. The shareholders
The law allows shareholders to sue for proximate (direct) as well as mediate
(indirect) damages [48], although the right of action differs. A shareholder is
proximately injured if his shares are seized illegally or if his quota of a
dividend or liquidation is not paid. Shareholders are mediately injured where
the company suffers proximate damages. Normally, shareholders suffer mediate
damages as a result of an auditor's breach of duty.
In the case of proximate damages, each injured shareholder may sue,
irrespective of potential claims for damages by other stockholders, creditors, or
the corporation. Neither bankruptcy nor the granting of a release will bar this
right of action [49].
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In the case of mediate damages, the shareholder's right of action varies
depending on whether the company is bankrupt. If the company is not
declared bankrupt, the shareholder has only a claim for damages to be paid to
the corporation. He therefore obtains compensation only indirectly and only in
proportion to his share in the corporation. Thus, a small shareholder will
receive only a fraction of the damages awarded. A small shareholder will rarely
sue for mediate damages because, should he lose the case, he would have to
pay all the court costs and attorneys' fees for both parties.
In the case of bankruptcy or liquidation receivership, the shareholder's right
of action is considerably restricted. He cannot claim mediate damages individ-
ually; rather, the receiver must assert the claim [50]. Only if the receiver waives
the right to sue can the shareholder demand assignment of the claim and the
right to sue independently.
The granting of a release by the general meeting of stockholders waives the
right of action for mediate damages only for those stockholders who consented
to that resolution or who subsequently acquired shares with knowledge of the
resolution. For the remaining stockholders, the right of action remains but the
statute of limitations is shortened to six months [51].
4.3. The creditors
The creditor's right to sue also varies depending on whether the claim is for
proximate or for mediate damages. The proximately damaged creditor can sue
individually in the same way proximately damaged stockholders can [52].
The right of action for mediate damages varies depending on whether the
corporation is in bankruptcy. As long as the corporation has not been declared
bankrupt, the corporation's creditors cannot claim their right of action under
the CO Art. 758. The reasoning is that as long as the company is able to
discharge its liabilities, the creditors have suffered no injury.
In the case of bankruptcy, the creditor's right of action is essentially the
same as that of a shareholder [53]. Creditors, however, are usually more
interested in raising claims for damages than are shareholders. Creditors'
claims must be satisfied first; only the surplus which remains after full
compensation of creditors is distributed to the shareholders [54].
The granting of a release by the shareholder has no effect on the claims of
creditors. The importance of a release is therefore almost completely emascu-
lated by the rule that, if the company goes bankrupt, the receiver may sue
based on the creditor's right of action, even if the company's own right of
actions is extinguished because of a release. Therefore, in the case of bank-
ruptcy, a release is largely ineffective.
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5. Conclusion
The number of liability actions instituted against auditors in Switzerland
has increased remarkably during the past several years. Unfortunately, the
present state of the law governing the liability of auditors has brought about
arbitrary results in these cases. Frivolous cases are routinely asserted in
bankruptcy cases, for example, whereas meritorious actions for mediate
damages are not brought by creditors because of procedural limitations, nor by
individual shareholders because of the risk of paying court costs. In addition.
once a lawsuit is brought, a single defendant may enjoy mitigation of damages
despite considerable negligence, whereas the least negligent of a group of
defendants may have to pay full damages.
Legal reform should therefore aim toward two ends. Initially, bona fide
claims outside of bankruptcy should be facilitated, easing procedural restric-
tions against creditors. Second, unreasonable and arbitrary damage awards
should be avoided by allowing for liability based on degrees of negligence,
even in cases involving more than one defendant.
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